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Reducing Corruption in International Business Decisions: 
Prospects, Frameworks & Techniques 
 
Abstract 
This paper reports the results of a rare interview/questionnaire survey of 41 
multinational business managers in India regarding their personal experiences of 
corrupt practices. Despite current trends and traditional scepticism, quite 
favourable prospects for reducing corruption are indicated, provided that 
multifaceted approaches are adopted that appeal to intrinsic and extrinsic 
motives. Accordingly, a corruption related decision-making model is proposed, 
for use as an heuristic guide in circumstances involving corrupt business 
practices.   
 
[1] Introduction 
 
Historically, all societies have harboured an element of corruption. For example, 
in India, Kautilya’s Artsashstra sets out 40 different ways in which public 
officials made illegitimate gain from public office. Recently, corruption has 
become almost an expected aspect of international business (e.g. Pieth 1999) 
whilst a series of major corporate scandals have reinforced a general perception 
that it is spreading.  
 
At the same time there has been a steady growth of the Business Ethics movement 
in practice, consulting and education. This has taken place at the global-
institutional level with the expansion of activities by non-governmental 
organisations such as Transparency International; but also at the micro level 
where executives, consultants, institutes and educators have developed and 
promoted management techniques including codes of ethics, mission statements, 
stakeholder–oriented strategy and investment models and Ethical decision-making 
(EDM) models.    
 
Given the vast sums that are at stake, sums dwarfing most strategic business 
investment decisions, it is noteworthy that there have been very few attempts to 
develop management techniques that specifically relate to corrupt practices, such 
as bribery. Furthermore, due to the obvious difficulty of obtaining any micro-level 
empirical data about participation in corrupt acts (e.g. Klitgaard 1988) there are 
neither behavioural models nor heuristic guides tailored to the CRDM 
(Corruption-related decision-making) context. 
 
Following an identification of distinct forms of bribery, the paper reports some 
results of an interview/questionnaire survey of 41 multinational business 
managers in India (made possible by a long established personal network) 
regarding their personal experiences of corrupt practices. The survey was 
conducted at Mumbai, the financial capital of India, between 2002 and 2003. A 
sample of 70 major multinational companies located in Mumbai was drawn from 
diverse industries such as banks, airlines, pharmaceuticals, information 
technology and electronics, consumer goods, oil companies, automobiles and 
heavy electrical. These seventy companies represent market leaders in their 
respective industry segments with a minimum turnover of at least Indian rupees 
10 billion each. Besides, all of them command premium brand names and 
substantial market shares in the Indian market. Out of the 70 companies, 41 
responded. Company Executives responding/interviewed were at the levels of 
Chief executive officer or senior managers dealing with public relations or senior 
managers involved in business promotion. The questionnaires were administered 
in person and interviews conducted to ensure clarity of responses. The findings 
are interpreted (sections 4 and 5) with reference to the general prospects for 
reducing corruption and fostering ethical decision-making in business. In contrast 
with some traditional viewpoints and current trends (section 7) quite favourable 
prospects are indicated, provided that multi-faceted approaches are adopted that 
take into account both the extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for behaviour. 
Accordingly, a simple Corruption-related decision-making model (CDRM model) 
is proposed, as a practical heuristic guide (refer figure 5) for multinational 
business managers. 
   
 
[2] Bribery 
 
“Corruption” can refer to a state of affairs (e.g. within Enron) but it can also be a 
transitive verb: to make someone corrupt. It is this latter notion of engagement 
and transformation of other actors that is quite central to the present study. One 
can further classify acts of corruption by context, purpose and magnitude; each 
form becoming amenable to a distinctive ethical analysis. Examples include:   
(i) a bribe to secure competitive advantage, in an otherwise legal 
transaction (e.g. Lockheed in Japan, in the 1970s) 
(ii) a facilitating payment to secure preferential treatment from a public 
servant (e.g. Motorola in Russia, described in Donaldson et al, 2003 p429)) 
(iii) a bribe to have an illegal activity performed in (a) a legitimate regime 
(e.g. bribing a jailer to free a convicted murderer), or (b) an oppressive 
regime (e.g. to free a political prisoner under torture) 
 
There are also distinct analytic perspectives: that of an observer of an act of 
corruption versus that of a participant in a corrupt process or in corruption-related 
decisions (CRD’s). For participants who are bribe-givers, there is a clear 
distinction between active and passive corruption (Table 1), the former denoting 
an active role, the later a role of compliance. A multinational business manager 
can initiate a process of corruption (offering bribes to others, or soliciting bribes 
for oneself), or can face a demand to give someone a payment  
 
   
Table 1   Active and passive corruption 
Giver is 
active
Receiver is 
passive
Giver is 
passive
Receiver is 
active
Initiates
Complies
Bribe 
Receiver..
Bribe giver..
Initiates Complies
 
Prevalence  
Passive bribe situations are very common. According to the survey no fewer than 
37 out of 41 multinational business managers reported that bribes had been asked 
for sometimes or frequently in the host country (i.e. India). Multinational business 
managers in the survey represent the company’s country of origin (home country) 
operating in India being the host country where the business operations are 
conducted.  
 
    Table 2. Frequency of passive bribes, domestic and foreign 
 
 
 Never / 
rarely 
Sometimes / 
frequently 
At Home 40 1 
 In Host 4 37 
 
This finding is consistent with the standard analysis that predicts that outsiders are 
“easy pickings”. First it is known that the bribe-giver is unlikely to face a penalty 
at home (although the FCPA and its equivalents must be considered). Second   
concerns for reputation and collective shadow of the future might be expected to 
play a small role, to the extent that the presence in the host is temporary.  In the 
home country (Table 2 column 1), the situation or the willingness to confess are   
different, in these respects.  
 
Prevention 
Many researchers have studied corruption internationally (e.g. Scott 1972; 
Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Sen 1999, to mention a few) yet most 
publications that discuss corruption control have focussed on the public official 
with related legal accountability and control mechanisms, including increasing 
their pay to reduce demand pressure. In contrast, the supply side (i.e. the business 
managers who normally pay) has not been so thoroughly studied.  Furthermore, 
all studies that are concerned with remedial action have cast officials and 
managers into the role of homo oeconomicus (one exception is Sen’s discussion of 
mafia-like deontological codes that guarantee some illicit contracts). That is, 
multinational business managers are assumed to be performing their historical 
trading role, with guile as necessary.  
 
As a result, the proposed remedies all emphasise “accountability” and the 
extrinsic consequences of corrupt acts. These consequences, including 
prosecution, are then assumed to be framed in managers’ minds as part of 
operating risk. To date, actual CRDM (corruption-related decision-making) 
processes at the level of individual managers have not been very fully considered. 
In particular, there has been no attempt to provide decision support (guides, 
heuristic methods) to business managers in specific situations of corruption. This 
is surprising, given the frequency and importance of CRDM, not to mention the 
many other tools and techniques that have been designed for guiding decision- 
making in business.  
 
 
[3] Consequences 
 
At the aggregate level, corruption has been identified as “a major stumbling block 
in the path to successful economic progress” (Sen 1999 p 275-8). For example, 
corruption is known to make many public policies ineffective, to draw investment 
away from productive pursuits and to foster the growth of violent organisations. 
 
Business Consequences 
As infamously displayed in Carl Kotchian’s testimony for Lockheed Corporation, 
the typical actual consequence of non-payment of any solicited or demanded bribe 
is a serious loss of business, with the associated harms to the various stakeholders. 
The present study of multinational business managers in India, shows just how 
“typical” that really is (Table 3). A clear majority (35/41 or 85%) revealed that 
non-payment of a solicited bribe had indeed resulted in a loss of business, for 
them. Put differently, non-compliance with bribery demands generally leads to 
utility-losses for decision makers and for all others who fall within their scope of 
moral concern (e.g. employees, suppliers, family).  
 
    Table 3.   Frequency of lost business consequent upon non-payment of solicited bribe  
 
 
Never / 
rarely 
Sometimes / 
 usually 
6 35 
 
 
 
Moral and psychological effects 
The data also indicates that despite these business experiences, there remains a 
sense and an understanding that the locus of corruption and the corresponding 
focus of any truly remedial action lies “beyond the boundary of the skin” at the 
level of psychic utilities, or hearts and minds (to borrow from economic- 
psychology and political theory, respectively) 
 
    Table 4.  Experienced managers’ beliefs about corruption and the human condition 
 
 
  No / rarely To an extent + 
Are humans non-corrupt?  4 37 
Can legislation prevent C? 11 29 
Can C be eliminated? 27 14 
 
 
Of the 41 multinational business managers, almost all having direct personal 
experience of corruption, 37 of them still believed that “to an extent, humans are 
non-corrupt”. Taking into account the cultural context of the survey, the thrust of 
this response seems to be that, despite the prevalence of corruption, there remains 
a robust faith in ultimate human potential and fundamental goodness (similar to 
theological perfectibility), Thus, the question becomes one of how to realise more 
of that potential in the here and now. Legislation (i.e. extrinsic utility-based 
measures) is also seen by these managers as effective to some extent but 
incapable of eliminating corruption. Furthermore (Table 4 last row) in the absence 
of any specific proposed measures directed towards transforming behaviour from 
within, there is a pervasive sense of resignation and acceptance that a certain level 
of corruption seems inevitable.    
 
To the extent that the relevant “consequences” of bribery encompass both (i) the 
business consequences (for all stakeholders) and (ii) substantial moral and 
psychological effects, it follows that attempts at intervention and reduction, 
including the design and use of incentives, codes, decision-guides and so on 
should be based upon these richer assumptions about the players. Put differently, 
participants in corrupt acts are not only homo-oeconomicus, they are also homo-
cogitans and homo-civicus (rational-moral agents). Regimes and techniques to 
reduce corruption might be more effective if they are designed accordingly. 
Indeed this belief lies behind almost all of the currently available Business Ethics 
(BE) frameworks, models and techniques.  
 
 
[4] CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
In this section, existing frameworks in Business Ethics are applied to CRDM 
(Corruption-related decision-making). The first elaborates the above mentioned 
distinction between business consequences and moral-psychological effects, the 
second places CRDM relative to legal, ethical and social norms. Both frameworks 
inform the subsequent analysis of behavioural change. 
 
Exchange utility and psychic utility  
 
The distinction between “business consequences” and “moral-psychological 
effects” is significant for CRD’s (corruption-related decisions) and for attempts at 
intervention, where one can “take note of each” (e.g. Sen 1987).   
 
In an utility-based analysis of CRD’s (corruption-related decisions) (Figure 2) the 
relevant business consequences of acceptance of a demand (passive corruption) 
include (i) the near-certainty of the net business benefits from the completed deal, 
(ii) the increased likelihood of net benefits from future business deals (net of bribe  
payments) with similar entities. Against this, there is (i) the expected legal 
penalties and reputation effects associated with discovery of the bribe, together 
with (iv) any negative expected business consequences of weakening of the will, 
or the strengthening of habits of compliance with bribe demands. There is also (v) 
a marginal (2nd order) “shadow of the future” effect implying increased future 
systemic costs. In the case of rejection of a demand (non-compliance), relevant 
utility-based consequences can be identified under similar categories, whereupon 
the net overall utility becomes (hypothetically) apparent to a (narrow) utility-
maximiser.  
 
     
 
Figure 2.  Economic and psychological consequences of CRDM 
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An extended analysis of CRD’s (corruption-related decisions) that incorporates 
psychic utility (Figure 2) expands the categories of consequences to include (i) an 
individuals’ long-term anxieties about possible discovery and prosecution, (ii) 
anticipated loss of self esteem, and other effects on individuals’ own characters, 
as well as (iii) a generalised resignation, or loss of humane ideals. These in turn 
have foreseeable flow-on consequences for psychic utilities.  
 
Legal, Ethical and Social Norms  
The analysis can be further extended with reference to the standard distinction 
between law, morality and social acceptability; or as Scott (1972) put it: legal 
norms, public interest and public opinion. Legal anti-corruption regimes provide 
the extrinsic (utility-based) constraints, but they also express and communicate 
principles that might be internalised (influencing psychic utilities). “Ethics” refers 
here to utilitarian consequences, deontological codes and sense of identity, each  
extended to incorporate intrinsic values or psychic utilities.  Both are relevant to  
political attempts at creating conditions for ethical business and to the design and 
uptake by managers of “tools” of ethical analysis.  
 
   
 
 
Figure 3.   Legal ethical and social norms influencing CRDM 
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The relationship between the legal and ethical norms that influence CRD’s is 
mediated by the nature of the relevant home and host political regimes. As 
mentioned earlier, it can be ethical to actively bribe in order to free a tortured 
political prisoner. Similarly it can be considered ethical to offer facilitating 
payments (gifts) to public officers in cases where (a) their salary placed them 
below the poverty line (possibly in anticipation of receipt of  these same “gifts”), 
or (b) where such small payments are clearly expected to lead to overall benefits.  
 
The notion of social acceptability (SA) is also pertinent. In this context it refers to 
the actual (empirical) pre-dispositions, attitudes, policies and capabilities of key 
entities within “societies”, such as managerial-political elites, the media and non-
governmental organisations such as Transparency International, OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and the United 
Nations. The political dynamics mediating between SA (social acceptability) and 
law include (i) lobbying activities and (ii) the exploitation of temporary 
opportunities for influencing others. Both are significant in the context of 
corruption reduction efforts.  
 
With regard to lobbying, corporations that have internationally competitive 
market offerings stand to benefit most from lobbying for stronger anti-corruption 
regimes, but everyone can benefit from the decreased costs of doing business. 
With regard to timing of moves against corruption, the Fabian doctrine (e.g. 
Geoghegan 2003, p84) seems highly relevant: for the right moment you must wait 
“as Fabius did most patiently, when warring against Hannibal”. That is, historical 
moments exists (such as post-Enron) when behavioural and social change can be 
effectively facilitated.  
 
[5] Transitions 
 
Anti-corruption policies implicitly aim to foster changes in business behaviour 
and social wellbeing. The Fabian doctrine continues to inform in this regard, as 
they believed that gradual evolution towards a more just society would take place 
under the guidance of experts. Under contemporary conditions these must include 
business managers, consultants, educators and non-governmental organisations.  
The Ethical Socialists (another British movement) further believed that 
“fundamental transformations had to occur in the hearts of individuals” (2003: 
p79). Furthermore, some saw the political arena (government, electorate) as the 
main site for the necessary “transformation”, others focussed upon the industrial 
arena (i.e. business managers, business policies). Almost all contemporary 
Business Ethics research and consulting practice follows the latter tradition. As 
Donaldson & Dunfee (1999 p25) put it: “Business has the power to uplift, 
business can also corrupt and damage”.  
 
Rationalities 
At a more abstract and theoretical level, transitions towards a “more just society” 
with reduced levels of corruption can be cast in terms of distinctive forms of 
rationality (Singer 1994, 1997). The “transition” depicted in Figure 4 is from 
narrow rational utility maximisation (RUM) and an associated weakness of will, 
towards an extended RUM, involving resoluteness, meta-preference, deliberative 
and reflective forms. The latter forms incorporate psychic utilities, as well as 
utility from exchanges (Figure 2). To the extent these satisfy several evaluative 
meta-rational criteria (e.g. globality, universalisability, self-support) the transition 
amounts to a betterment of the human condition. 
 
Sen (1999 p28) mentioned an historical example. When agricultural slavery was 
replaced with labour contracts, the consumption levels of the remaining slaves 
compared favourably with those of the “free” agricultural workers; yet most chose 
freedom. Thus, not only do social transitions generally involve utility-based 
motives and intrinsic (expressive) motives, but there also remains a real 
possibility of transition and change, when the timing is right. Furthermore, Sen 
(1999) has repeatedly emphasised that progressive social and economic 
development requires a multi-faceted approach, indicating a role for managerial 
decision techniques and guides.  
 
      
 
Figure 4.  Transition amongst rationalities 
Preference-based
Forms of rationality
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Weakness of will
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Deliberative
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globality,
universalisability
Self-supportiveness
Evaluate
critically
Evaluate
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 [6] Techniques 
There are several techniques available for reducing corruption. They include 
straightforward moral suasion (persuasion with words, not money), acting as a 
role model, or setting an example. The effect of the latter is prone to being 
underestimated (e.g. Axelrod 1983). To these, one can add a variety of ethics 
policies, codes, ethical decision-making models (EDM), strategy-stakeholder 
models and related systems models. Specific corruption-related decision-making 
models (CRDM models) can also be designed. Of course, all such techniques can 
be treated with a mixture of cynicism and good faith. 
 
Policies and codes 
The survey indicated that written business policies on corruption are very 
common (Table 5). However, only 3 of 41 respondents (7%) knew of any 
company codes (including their own) that mentioned any of the consequences of 
corrupt practice. Policies were simply a list of “do-nots”, without concurrent 
attempts to influence hearts and minds.  
 
 
    Table 5.  Existence and contents of company policies 
 
 Yes No / n.a.
Policy exists ? 33 8 
Mentions impact? 3 38 
 
 
However (Table 6) it is also common practice to actually refer to these policies 
when faced with corruption situations (passive bribery). It thus appears that there 
is ample scope for augmenting corporate policies, so that they provide richer 
descriptions of the economic and psychological consequences of corrupt acts, as 
depicted earlier (in Figure 2)  
 
 
    Table 6.  Managerial responses to passive corruption, 
 
Facing passive corruption, 
 manager refers to…  
 
Company policy 33 
Discretion, discussion  6 
Combination of above 12 
 
 
 
Strategic decision-making models / Ethical decision-making models  
Strategic and ethical decision-making models commonly used by consultants and 
educators can also foster changes in the managerial mindset. One can readily 
distinguish between those that incorporate social/ethical issues explicitly (e.g. 
stakeholder model, Ethical decision-making (EDM) flowchart) versus those that 
are narrowly instrumental.   Such models can in turn be depicted (Appendix 1) as 
market-offerings or as knowledge-products designed and deployed with the 
specific intention of fostering transitions.  For example, models of competitive 
strategy and hyper-competition tend to foster a narrow utility-based culture in 
which resistance to financial temptation is difficult, whereas ethical models 
(Stakeholder, EDM) tend to foster a more reflective and humanistic culture.   
 
 
A Corruption-related decision model 
The CRDM model (Roy 2001) is in the latter category. As with the standard EDM 
flowchart, it sets out a simple framework for systematically appraising 
alternatives in corruption-related contexts, where a manager is often under 
considerable economic and psychological pressure. The distinction between 
active and passive corruption is first made explicit, along with the further 
distinction between extortion payments, facilitating payments and other types. A 
further classification (Type A /Type B) depends on whether or not the payment in 
question carries a significant risk of violating stakeholders’ fundamental human 
rights, or blocking sustainable development. Type A payments carry with it the 
risk of such violation while Type B does not. 
 
The CRDM model is based on the following heuristic: (i) In cases of active 
corruption decisions  the model simply prescribes “do not proceed”.    
 
     
 
Figure 5.  A Corruption-Related Decision-making Model 
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In passive corruption decisions, ethical reasoning (by the bribe payer) still has a 
chance to perform its part. Accordingly, where there is reasonable expectation of 
human right violations consequent upon payment, the prescription is, again, “do-
not proceed”. In cases of extortion and Type B facilitating payments, payments 
are endorsed by the model, provided that they are essentially unavoidable, under 
the circumstances. However, at the same time, broader strategic actions are 
prescribed, in order to support anti-bribery initiatives and non-governmental 
organisations, such as Transparency International. In endorsing these practical 
moral choices, it is recognised that the bribe-giver often has to give in, as a matter 
of commercial prudence, or that the initiator might be in poverty, or that the 
overall consequences for oppression and human rights might be benevolent. Thus 
the model implicitly combines act-utilitarianism with an observance of moral-
minima or hyper-norms. 
 
[7] Trends 
Despite the availability of such techniques and the continuing growth of the 
Business Ethics movement, some casual and formal evidence indicates a current 
adverse trend towards narrow utility maximisation in the business and managerial 
mindset (opposite of that depicted in Figure 4 and similar to that in Appendix 1b). 
For example, in the present survey of multinational business managers in India, it 
was found (Table 4) that many of the managers who had actually lost business 
due to their resisting bribery on previous occasions, subsequently offered bribes 
(active corruption). Put differently, they learned from their experience, or they 
adapted, as they are so often encouraged to do in the conventional managerial 
discourse.   
 
 
    Table 4.  Frequency of offering bribes due to previous lost business 
 
 
Never /  
rarely 
Sometimes / 
usually 
14 29 
 
 
 
A similar trend was also found in a recent study in the USA (Saiia, Carroll & 
Buchholtz 2003, p169). Corporate managers in charge of philanthropy programs 
were becoming increasingly “strategic” in their activities, over time.  Put simply, 
their mindset has been moving away from moral commitments, towards the 
strategic-rationality of game models. Furthermore, according to the study 
“institutional, firm and individual-level influences (have combined) to 
precipitate” the current trend.  
 
[8] Conclusion 
 
Despite the evidence and the traditional doubts about the effectiveness of moral 
suasion, there remains a robust sense that attempts at promoting a more ethical 
business climate and culture remain worthwhile, if not urgent. The regulatory / 
accountability approach and the ethical approach share the same goal: both are 
driven by a commitment to gradual moral progress. What is perhaps needed now 
is a much stronger appeal to intrinsic motives and psychic utilities with their  
consequences for human wellbeing. Historically, the alternative appeal to 
strategic rationality combined with the will to power has almost always 
culminated in a state of oppression, often with violence aimed at challenging or 
overthrowing the identified elite of the day. 
 
Finally, it is perhaps worth remembering that all ideologies are flexible and 
dynamic. For example, Karl Marx himself wrote favourably about capitalism, as 
compared with bonded labour (Sen 1999 p29). Accordingly, the political quest to 
link production and distribution processes more directly to social justice and 
human rights is far from over. As Sen also noted (p279), the success of capitalism 
depends in part on “business honesty (in the face of contrary temptations)”.  It is 
hoped that the CRDM model (figure 5) with its associated analysis of corruption 
can foster success by making that type of honesty more practical, appealing and 
common.  
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